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Abstract. Systems of systems (SoSs) are characterised by a challeng-
ing combination of continuous evolution, emergent behaviour and dis-
tributed, autonomous, independent constituents. The development of
SoSs that can tolerate faults and harmful events is hampered by these
and other complexities. Currently there is little in the way of models or
tools to help SoS developers to design fault-tolerant SoSs. In this paper
we present a structured approach for capturing requirements for a fault-
tolerant SoS and a fault modelling architectural framework (FMAF) that
supports disciplined and reusable development of fault-tolerant architec-
tures, as well as a traceable mapping of the fault-tolerant requirements
into SoS architectural designs. Finally we present an example real-world
SoS case study to demonstrate the application of our techniques.
1 Introduction
Systems of systems (SoSs) are characterised by continuous evolution, emergent
behaviour and the presence of distributed, autonomous constituents which ex-
hibit managerial and operational independence [1, 2]. As a result, development of
SoSs that are capable of tolerating faults and other potentially harmful events
(including failures of constituents) is a daunting task, hampered by the com-
plexity of integrating heterogeneous and independent SoS constituent systems
that may not have been designed for dependable integration, as well as the dif-
ficulty of communication between diverse stakeholders. The state of the art in
engineering fault-tolerant SoSs lacks methods and tools to help SoS engineers en-
gage with other stakeholders and make explicit, informed and traceable choices
about the fault assumptions, the fault tolerance strategies and the redundancy
to be employed.
Whilst there is a substantial body of studies on architecting fault tolerance
systems (see, for example, a recent series of WADS workshops3), there are no
substantial advances in developing architectural approaches to capturing faults
and fault tolerance in SoSs [3] and work in this area is currently still in its in-
fancy. Our previous work [3, 4] introduces an approach to architectural modelling
of SoS fault tolerance using SysML by describing a set of views that together
build a model of the erroneous behaviour and recovery procedures present in an
3 www.cs.kent.ac.uk/events/conf2009/wads/
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SoS. These views fall into two categories: nominal, describing SoS structure and
behaviour under the assumptions that no faults are present; and erroneous, de-
scribing possible faults, errors and failures, and the behaviour of the SoS in the
presence of such dependability threats. Currently missing from the state of the
art is integrated and systematic reasoning about requirements and architectures
which establishes and captures traceable links between these two development
steps. This paper contributes to this area by developing:
– a structured approach to capturing requirements of fault-tolerant SoSs;
– a traceable mapping of the fault tolerance requirements into SoS architec-
tural designs; and
– an architectural framework that supports disciplined and reusable develop-
ment of fault-tolerant architectures.
To ensure a wider industrial acceptance our proposed solutions are devel-
oped for the Systems Modelling Language (SysML) [5, 6] and are supported by
industry-strength tools (we use Artisan Studio4 for developing prototypes and
experiments). The proposed engineering techniques will allow SoS engineers to
reuse their modelling experience and to support the best practice in developing
dependable SoSs.
2 Background
We provide background details on requirements engineering for SoSs in Sec-
tion 2.1. Section 2.2 discusses tracability and in Section 2.3 we detail an approach
to defining architectural frameworks.
2.1 Requirement Engineering for SoS
Requirements engineering is a vital part of the SoS development lifecycle. The
use of model-based requirements engineering (MBRE) techniques is already well-
established at the systems-level [7] and therefore we hypothesise that using
MBRE approaches for SoS may provide the associated benefits for SoS engi-
neering.
The COMPASS project5 has previously proposed an approach to MBRE
for SoS, extending the Approach to Context-based Requirements Engineering
(ACRE) [7] to consider the characteristics typical of an SoS6. This new approach
is called SoS-ACRE [9] and consists of several processes and views relating to
the requirements for the engineering and management of an SoS, as shown in
Figure 1.
4 www.atego.com/products/artisan-studio/
5 www.compass-research.eu/
6 The characteristics an SoS may exhibit are discussed in more detail in [8]
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Fig. 1. SoS-ACRE Processes [9]
The SoS-ACRE processes may be summarised as follows. The SoS Require-
ments Engineering Process has four processes: the SoS Requirements Develop-
ment process that performs the majority of the SoS-level requirements engi-
neering; the Requirements Elicitation Process where the initial requirements are
elicited from the relevant parts of the source elements; the Context Process that
defines a context at either the constituent system or SoS level; and the Verifica-
tion and Validation Definition Process that defines the verification and validation
criteria for the SoS.
For the management of SoS requirements, the SoS Requirements Manage-
ment Process has five processes defined: the Requirements Change Process that
controls changes to the constituent system or SoS requirements; the CS Pro-
cess Analysis that allows the management processes of a constituent system to
be understood; Requirement Control Process that ensures that all requirement
changes are agreed to and commitment is obtained; the Requirements Monitor
Process that allows changes in requirements at both the constituent system and
SoS level to be identified; and the Traceability Process that allows traceability
views to be set up.
Using processes defined for the SoS Requirements Engineering Process, re-
quirements are identified from source elements, described in detail, contextu-
alised in terms of the constituent systems of the SoS and its stakeholders, and
validated against scenarios. Traceability views are used to trace requirements to
their sources, and to the use cases described in the contexts. The processes and
views are described using SysML but they are intended to be notation-agnostic.
2.2 Traceability
Traceability is concerned with capturing the relationships between artefacts cre-
ated during the development process. Historically traceability has focussed on
‘requirements traceability’ (the ‘ability to describe and follow the life of a require-
ment, in both a forwards and backwards direction’ [10]). Research has identified
the importance of pre- and post-requirements traceability (e.g., see [10, 11]) and
3
Fig. 2. AF Context View Showing the Requirements for the CAFF
more recent work has extended traceability to links not involving requirements
(e.g., pointed out by [12]). Traceability can be important in fault-tolerant sys-
tems for supporting validation and verification activities [13]: accurate traces
enable the identification of artefacts linked to specific requirements, or of ratio-
nale behind project artefacts, to support activities such as model consistency
checking [14] or test case coverage validation [15]. Our approach is intended to
allow modellers to demonstrate how potential faults which have been identified
at an early stage of development are handled.
2.3 Defining Architectural Frameworks
We present in this paper a new Architectural Framework (AF) to address the
need for capturing fault tolerance aspects of SoS engineering (see Section 3).
We use the COMPASS AF Framework (CAFF) to develop this new AF. The
CAFF is a small architectural framework which is itself intended for use in the
definition of other AFs. We provide only a brief description of the CAFF here;
for full details see [16].
The CAFF is designed to address the requirements shown in Figure 2. For a
full discussion of these requirements, see [16]. In summary, the CAFF is designed
to ensure that:
– the needs of the AF are understood;
4
Fig. 3. Ontology Definition View for Architectural Frameworks
– the concepts and terms that the AF can model are defined;
– the views are identified;
– the needs for each view are understood and are related to the overall needs
of the AF;
– the definition of each view is specified and based on the concepts and terms
identified and
– any rules that constrain the AF are captured.
The CAFF is based on a number of concepts and relationships as described
in an ontology. The ontology (Figure 3) provides a visualisation of all the key
concepts pertinent to architectures and Architectural Frameworks, the termi-
nology used to describe them and the inter-relationships between said concepts.
It is based on concepts taken from [17] and [18]. The views of the CAFF are
defined according to this ontology.
Two concepts illustrated in Figure 3 that are important to understand are
those of Viewpoint and View. An Architectural Framework is made up of a
number of Viewpoints that define the information that can be presented. When
an actual architecture is developed that is based on the Architectural Framework,
then one produces Views that conform to the definitions in the corresponding
Viewpoint. Therefore a View is a realisation of a Viewpoint.
There are six viewpoints in the CAFF, grouped into a single Perspective, as
shown in Figure 4. They are:
– The AF Context Viewpoint (AFCV), which defines the context for the AF.
That is, it represents the AF concerns (requirements) in context.
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Fig. 4. Viewpoint Relationships View Showing Viewpoints and Perspectives that make
up the AF Framework
– The Ontology Definition Viewpoint (ODV) defines the ontology for the AF.
It is derived from the AFCV.
– The Viewpoint Relationships Viewpoint (VRV), which shows the relation-
ships between the viewpoints that make up the AF and groups them into
perspectives. It is derived from the ODV.
– The Viewpoint Context Viewpoint (VCV), which defines the context for a
particular viewpoint. That is, it represents the viewpoint concerns (require-
ments) in context for a particular viewpoint. It is derived from the AFCV.
– The Viewpoint Definition Viewpoint (VDV), which defines a particular view-
point, showing the viewpoint elements (and hence the ontology elements)
that appear on the viewpoint.
– The Rules Definition Viewpoint (RDV), which defines the various rules that
constrain the AF.
The viewpoints are collected into a single perspective, the AF & Architectures
Perspective, as shown by the enclosing package.
A process for using the CAFF is described in detail in [16]. In summary, the
CAFF is used in the following way:
1. Define the context for the AF to be produced; understand the requirements
that the AF is to address and model these by considering their use cases,
using an AFCV.
2. Define the ontology that is applicable to the AF to be produced; understand
the concepts and the relationships between them for the domain that the
AF is to be used in and model these using an ODV.
3. Using the AFCV and the ODV, identify candidate viewpoints that cover
the entire ODV. Group related viewpoints into perspectives. Capture the
viewpoints, perspectives and relationships between them on a VRV.
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4. For each viewpoint on the VRV, define the context for that viewpoint; un-
derstand the requirements that the viewpoint is to address and model these
using a VCV.
5. For each viewpoint on the VRV, define the viewpoint in terms of the concepts
and relationships from the ODV; model the viewpoint using a VDV.
6. Define any rules that apply to the AF; model such rules on a RDV.
The concepts behind considering requirements in a particular context are
described in [9] and [7].
3 Fault Modelling Architectural Framework
The Fault Modelling Architectural Framework (FMAF) aims to address the need
(discussed in Section 1) for a systematic approach to capturing fault tolerance
and dependability aspects of SoSs. The FMAF is an extension to the infor-
mal description of fault modelling viewpoints for describing faults and recovery
processes given previously [3]. The FMAF is created by applying the CAFF
(Section 2.3) to these fault modelling viewpoints to define a semi-formal model
and to describe the motivation behind them (see Appendix A for full model).
The FMAF supports SoS engineering in the presence of faults. Within this
vast research area, it particularly focuses on providing support for:
– definition of faults, errors and failures;
– identification of fault propagation chains;
– identification of constituent systems (and the connections and interfaces be-
tween them) needed to tolerate faults;
– identification of erroneous behaviour/recovery scenarios;
– definition of erroneous behaviour and recovery processes and
– description of process behaviour in the presence of faults and of recovery
process behaviour.
These are all included in the AFCV given in Figure 5.
Note that the AFCV requires that the FMAF be consistent with established
dependability concepts. To satisfy this we based the ODV (see Figure 6) for the
FMAF on concepts identified by Avizienis et al. [19]: a fault may lead to an
error through fault activation, which in turn may lead to a failure. A failure
may manifest itself as a fault as its effects are noticed higher up the system
hierarchy, e.g. a failure of a constituent system is considered to be a fault of the
SoS. We also use established process modelling techniques [20] as the basis of
our SoS behavioural modelling: we break down the behaviour of the SoS into
the behaviour within processes (low level behaviour) and the interaction between
processes (high level behaviour).
The viewpoints formalised in the FMAF are those described informally in
our previous work [3], summarised in Table 1. These include structural view-
points to define the faults, errors, failures and their propagation chains as well
as behavioural viewpoints that identify the behaviour of the SoS in the presence
7
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Fig. 5. AF Context View showing the requirements for the FMAF
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ODV Ontology Definition View [Fault Modelling Architectural Framework]
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«block»
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«block»
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«block»
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«block»
Recovery Process
«block»
Failure
«block»
Fault
«block»
Fault Activation
«block»
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observed at
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Fig. 6. Ontology Description View relating the key concepts of the FMAF
of identified faults. As an example, consider the Fault Propagation Viewpoint
(FPV), which supports the identification of fault propagation chains (see the
VCV in Figure 7). This includes the definition of possible causal chains between
faults, errors and failures as well as identifying the location of faults, the con-
stituents that can detect the errors and the interfaces of the SoS at which failures
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Table 1. Informal description of the FMAF viewpoints
Structural Viewpoints
Name Description
Fault/Error/Failure Definition Define faults, errors and failures of the SoS.
Faults, errors or failures may be generalised
into abstract categories.
Fault Propagation Identifies propagation of faults through errors
to failures, and records relationships between
the dependability threats and the constituents.
Fault Tolerance Structure Shows the composition of the SoS with the
required redundancy to tolerate a given fault.
Fault Tolerance Connections Shows connections and interfaces between
constituents of the SoS with the required
redundancy to tolerate a given fault.
Includes all the constituents identified in
the respective Fault Tolerance Structure View.
Behavioural Viewpoints
Name Description
Erroneous/Recovery Processes Identifies the processes of the SoS, including
erroneous behaviour and any required
recovery processes.
Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios Models behaviour in the presence of errors (with
and without recovery) as scenarios. Shows
erroneous behaviour propagation and
recovery procedure triggers.
Fault Activation Defines the behaviour within an SoS process
and identifies when faults may be activated,
what happens after activation and where
in the process the error may be detected.
Recovery Defines the behaviour of the recovery
procedures that are triggered once an error
has been detected.
may be observed. All faults, errors and failures shown in a FPV must be defined,
i.e. included in a Fault/Error/Failure Definition View. A VDV is given in Fig-
ure 8, showing the view elements of an FPV and their relationships. An example
of an FPV is given in Section 4.3, in Figure 12.
Supporting SoS engineering in the presence of faults is a vast and complex
task. The FMAF aims to be the first step for thinking about faults in SoSs
and designing dependability into the SoS. It necessarily makes abstractions to
manage the complexity of the task. For example, fault activation is modelled as
an event without explicitly defining how the fault is activated. This means that
the same modelling approach is applicable to a wide variety of fault activation
scenarios, such as the manifestation of hardware failures, internal infrastruc-
ture failures or software bugs, or even the exploitation of a vulnerability in a
9
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VCV Viewpoint Context View [Fault Propagation Viewpoint]
Fault Propagation Viewpoint
SoS Engineer
Support
identification of fault
propagation chain
Identify fault
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Fig. 7. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault Propagation Viewpoint of the FMAF
constituent by an error (or malicious system) in the environment of the SoS.
Likewise the details of how errors are detected are also abstracted away by a
similar usage of error detection events. These details can of course be included
in a modelling approach that applies the FMAF, but the way to do so has not
(yet) been prescribed by the FMAF. It is also worth noting that a single view in
a model may implement more than one FMAF viewpoint. For example, recovery
processes can and do fail. Therefore fault activation and error detection may be
modelled within a Recovery View, which would mean that the view is also a
Fault Activation View. A final observation of the FMAF is that an approach for
describing different modes of an SoS and transitions between them (e.g. transi-
tion to a degraded mode if full recovery from a fault is not possible) deserves
further exploration. It is likely that extra viewpoints will be needed (to show
for example the possible modes and events that cause the transitions between
them) for this purpose. Extensions and further viewpoints of the model are the
subject of future work.
4 Tracing Requirements to Fault Tolerant Architectures
In Section 4.1 we briefly describe the case study used to illustrate the methods
proposed in this paper. In Section 4.2, we use the SoS-ACRE approach intro-
duced in Section 2 to describe the requirements for the case study. Finally, in
Section 4.3, we trace model elements of the case study to the defined require-
ments.
10
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Fig. 8. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault Propagation Viewpoint of the FMAF
4.1 Case Study
The case study is based on a unified emergency response call centre operating in
the Fruili Venezia Giulia region of North Italy, supplied by the Italian company
Insiel, and is described in [3]. The SoS aims to provide aid to a specified target for
any legitimate phone call made to the emergency health services. Both the nom-
inal behaviour and erroneous behaviour (described using the FMAF viewpoints
formalised in this paper) of the case study are provided in [3]. In Section 4.3 we
extend some of these views to include traceability links to requirements.
4.2 Requirements
We concentrate on the requirements engineering aspect of the SoS-ACRE ap-
proach. We begin requirements modelling using the SoS requirements engineering
process in which the source elements are initially identified in the Source Ele-
ment View (SEV). Next we identify the constituent systems and the stakeholders
of the SoS, captured in Context Definition Views (CDV) where each entity is
considered as a context for the requirements elicited later. These views (and the
complete set of requirements engineering views) can be found in Appendix B.
The identified constituent systems are the Phone System, Call Centre, Radio
System and Emergency Response Units (ERUS). The stakeholders include the
Caller, Target, Health Authority and Radio Repairman. The stakeholder diagram
should be updated through the requirements engineering process, as further
requirements are identified and any changes made to the SoS structure.
The next stage of the process is to signal the start of the requirements elic-
itation process, where initial requirements are elicited from the relevant parts
of the source elements. This process results in the definition of a Requirements
Definition View (RDV), as shown in Figure 9. The RDV shows the top-level
11
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Fig. 9. Requirements Definition View (RDV) for the Insiel Case Study
requirement of the SoS to Provide Emergency Response which is broken into
sub-requirements which must be fulfilled. The identified requirements are traced
back to the source elements (though this could conceivably form a separate
diagram) to ensure there is adequate traceability of requirements. For exam-
ple in the RDV in Figure 9, the Tolerate Faults in SoS requirement traces to
the COMPASS Description of Work and the sub-requirements trace to Private
Communications with Insiel and ISADS 2013 Paper. For this case study, this is
the end of the elicitation process. In a larger study, there should be a process of
identifying needs and requirements, involving multiple source elements.
On completion of the requirements elicitation process, the requirements for
each identified context are considered firstly for the SoS and subsequently for
each individual constituent system. We therefore begin with defining the Re-
quirement Context View (RCV) for the SoS, placing the requirements in context
– defined as use cases. Each use case should be traceable to the requirements
identified in the RDV. For each use case, we identify the stakeholders of the
SoS who also have some involvement or interest. This process culminates in
combining related RCVs into a Context Interaction View (CIV). The CIV for
an identified fault (containing only those use cases related to that fault) in the
case study is given in Figure 10. This identifies which use cases the various con-
stituents have some involvement in. It should be noted that, in SoS-ACRE, the
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Fig. 10. Context Interaction View (CIV) for the Insiel Case Study
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Description :Caller :Target :Phone System :Call Centre :Radio System :Mobile Phone System :ERU:Radio Repairman
An emergency call is received and answered... ref Insiel FM Validation Answer Call 1
The Caller provides details of the emergency... ref Insiel FM Validation Question Caller 1
An ERU is allocated to the mission... allocateERU
The Call Centre detects a Radio System failure ref Insiel FM Validation Detect Radio System Failure 1
par par
Assess severity of Radio System failure assess radio failure
alt Radio System has a permanent failure... alt Radio System has a permanent failure
Repair Radio System ref Insiel FM Validation Repair Radio System 1
end alt
also par
The Call Centre tolerates the Radio System failure ref Insiel FM Validation Recover From Radio System Failure 1
The ERU provides aid to the Target provide aid
end par
VIV Insiel FM Validation Tolerate Radio System Failure 1
Fig. 11. Validation Interaction View (VIV) for the Insiel Case Study
meaning of the use case may be different depending on the point of view of the
constituents.
The completion of this process results in the initiation of verification and
validation for the different contexts. We define scenarios for each use case for
a given context. We partially demonstrate this process for the CIV by defining
a Validation Interaction View (VIV). Similar to the CIV, the VIV combines
several Validation Views (VV) for different contexts participating in common
use cases. The VIVs are defined as a semi-formal scenario as shown in Figure 11,
in which an error is detected, the recovery procedure is initiated and repairs
made. Several sub-VIVs are referenced and can be seen in Appendix B.
When each use case has been validated for the SoS, we return to the contexts
where additional reviews are performed. The full requirements process produces
RCVs for each constituent system which are subject to review and checking.
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Table 2. FMAF to requirements engineering: Traceability Identification View
Traceable Type Relationship
From To Type
Fault/Error/Failure/Definition View Requirement tracesTo
Fault Requirement tracesTo
Error Requirement tracesTo
Failure Requirement tracesTo
detectedBy dependency Use case tracesTo
(Fault Propagation View) Validation View tracesTo
Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios View Validation View tracesTo
Error detection interruptible region Use case tracesTo
(Fault Activation View) Validation View tracesTo
Recovery View
Use case tracesTo
Validation View tracesTo
4.3 Tracing Requirements to SoS Model
We provide a traceable mapping from requirements engineering elements to
FMAF elements and illustrate its application using the Insiel case study. The
traceability modelling makes use of the COMPASS Traceability Pattern [21],
which defines four views for describing traceability:
– Relationship Identification View (RIV) – identifies the set of traceability
relationships that may be used.
– Traceability Identification View (TIV) – identifies which traceable elements
may partake in which traceability relationships.
– Traceability View (TV) – shows traces between traceable elements.
– Impact View (IV) – shows traceability trees for traceable elements (produced
only when conducting an impact analysis).
‘Traceable elements’ may be views or view elements.
For the case study we identify a single traceability relationship tracesTo in the
RIV. This is a general traceability relationship between a view or view element
in the FMAF and a view or view element from the requirements engineering
model. The TIV in Table 2 shows the elements that can be traced to and from
using the tracesTo relationship. These relationships all trace backwards from
FMAF elements to requirements elements (in practical usage the traces are in-
tended to be bi-directional). It is also possible to trace between two requirements
engineering elements or two FMAF elements.
The relationships identified in the TIV were applied to the Insiel case study
to create TVs (see Appendix C for complete model). As an example, consider
the Fault Propagation View (see Section 3) shown in Figure 12. This FPV shows
a fault identified in the Insiel case study where the Radio System suffers a total
failure and cannot send or receive transmissions. The fault causes an error state
in which the Radio System is unavailable for use for communication between
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!«Fault Propagation View» {faultsOfInterest = Complete Failure of the Radio System}
ibd Traceability View: Fault Propagation [Fault 1]
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Attended by ERU
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: Radio System
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: Complete Failure of
the Radio System
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«detectedBy» «detectedBy»
«observedAt»
tracesTo
«Use Case» Detect Radio System Failure
«Object Sequence Diagram» Insiel FM Validation Detect Radio System Failure 1
tracesTo
«Use Case» Detect Radio System Failure
Fig. 12. A Traceability View for the Insiel Radio System Failure FPV
the Call Centre and the ERUs. During this error state it is not possible for the
Call Centre to provide details of rescues to ERUs, which may then lead to a
Target (e.g., a casualty) not being attended. Such an occurrence is considered
to be a failure of the SoS. Traceability relationships from the TIV were added
to elements of the FPV as shown in Figure 12. For example, the detectedBy
dependency between the Error and the Call Centre was traced to the Detect
Radio System Failure use case identified in the CIV (Figure 10) and also to a
Validation View that describes detection of the Radio System Failure. Note that
Figure 12 is therefore a TV as well as an FPV.
It is worth noting that further case studies may highlight the need for ad-
ditional traceability relationships. Thus the traceability relationships identified
in Table 2 may not be a complete list. It may also be beneficial to use stereo-
types to be more specific about the types of requirements engineering elements
(requirements, use cases, etc.) the FMAF elements can trace to – this will be
explored in our future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a structured approach to capturing require-
ments of fault-tolerant SoSs, a traceable mapping of the fault tolerance require-
ments into SoS architectural designs and an architectural framework that sup-
ports disciplined and reusable development of fault tolerant architectures. We
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demonstrate these developments with a case study based on an emergency re-
sponse SoS.
The FMAF describes a range of viewpoints to encompass faults, errors and
failures in an SoS architectural model. Work is ongoing to define a SysML profile
to complement the FMAF introduced in Section 3. The profile specialises FMAF
views and view elements to include additional information through the use of
stereotypes (of underlying SysML model elements) and associated tags. The case
study in Section 4 is described using the profile in [4]. This profile may be used
in any SysML toolset with profiling support and aims to provide support for
ensuring model consistency and translation to external analysis tools.
In Section 1, we state that, to date, there have been no substantial advances
in developing architectural approaches to capturing faults and fault tolerance in
SoSs. The work presented in this paper attempts to address this by amalgamat-
ing several – often separate – model-based SoS engineering activities as part of
an engineering method for fault modelling. We propose that the requirements,
fault-tolerant architectural models and traceability modelling efforts described
in this paper be complemented through the use of fault analysis and formal ver-
ification using CML [22, 23]. In [4] we demonstrate formal verification afforded
by the use of CSP and consider CML as future work.
Fault analysis is an important part of the fault modelling engineering method.
Our main ongoing and future work is to develop links from architectural models,
defined in SysML, to the industry-strength HiP-HOPS fault analysis tool7. As a
part of this work, we define a fault analysis framework (using CAFF), define a
SysML profile and provide tool support to link HiP-HOPS to the Artisan Studio
SysML tool.
A consequence of defining separate frameworks for fault modelling and for
fault analysis is the requirement to ensure there is a useful link between the
architectural models each require. Creating consistent modelling frameworks will
enable us to ensure complete traceability throughout the engineering method as
has been demonstrated on the work in this paper.
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A Fault Modelling Architectural Framework Complete
Model
This appendix contains all of the views that describe the FMAF (see Section 3)
as SysML diagrams.
Fig. 13. AF Context View showing the requirements for the FMAF
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Fig. 14. Ontology Description View relating the key concepts of the FMAF
Fig. 15. Viewpoint Relationship View relating the viewpoints of the FMAF
19
Fig. 16. Rules Definition View showing the rules of the FMAF
Fig. 17. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault/Error/Failure Definition Viewpoint of
the FMAF
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Fig. 18. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault/Error/Failure Definition Viewpoint
of the FMAF
Fig. 19. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault Propagation Viewpoint of the FMAF
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Fig. 20. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault Propagation Viewpoint of the FMAF
Fig. 21. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault Tolerance Structure Viewpoint of the
FMAF
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Fig. 22. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault Tolerance Structure Viewpoint of the
FMAF
Fig. 23. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault Tolerance Connections Viewpoint of
the FMAF
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Fig. 24. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault Tolerance Connections Viewpoint of
the FMAF
Fig. 25. Viewpoint Context View for the Erroneous/Recovery Processes Viewpoint of
the FMAF
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Fig. 26. Viewpoint Definition View for the Erroneous/Recovery Processes Viewpoint
of the FMAF
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Fig. 27. Viewpoint Context View for the Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios Viewpoint of
the FMAF
Fig. 28. Viewpoint Definition View for the Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios Viewpoint
of the FMAF
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Fig. 29. Viewpoint Context View for the Fault Activation Viewpoint of the FMAF
Fig. 30. Viewpoint Definition View for the Fault Activation Viewpoint of the FMAF
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Fig. 31. Viewpoint Context View for the Recovery Viewpoint of the FMAF
Fig. 32. Viewpoint Definition View for the Recovery Viewpoint of the FMAF
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B Insiel Requirements Engineering Complete Model
This appendix contains all of the views that were created following the require-
ments engineering guidelines for the Insiel case study (see Section 4) as SysML
diagrams.
Fig. 33. Source Element View for the Insiel Case Study
Fig. 34. Context Definition View for the Constituent Systems of the Insiel Case Study
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Fig. 35. Context Definition View for the Stakeholders of the Insiel Case Study
Fig. 36. Requirements Definition View for the Insiel Case Study
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Fig. 37. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study SoS
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Fig. 38. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study Phone System
32
Fig. 39. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study Call Centre
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Fig. 40. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study Radio System
Fig. 41. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study ERUs
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Fig. 42. Requirements Context View for the Insiel Case Study Mobile Phone System
Fig. 43. Context Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Radio System Failure
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Fig. 44. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Phone Voice Commu-
nications Use Case
Fig. 45. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Answer Call Use Case
Fig. 46. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Question Caller Use
Case
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Fig. 47. Validation View 0 for the Insiel Case Study Tolerate Faults Use Case
Fig. 48. Validation View 1 for the Insiel Case Study Tolerate Faults Use Case
Fig. 49. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Detect Radio System
Failure Use Case
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Fig. 50. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Recover From Radio
System Failure Use Case
Fig. 51. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Repair Radio System
Failure Use Case
Fig. 52. Validation Interaction View for the Insiel Case Study Tolerate Radio System
Failure Use Case
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C Insiel Requirements Traceability Complete Model
This appendix contains all of the views that were created following the traceabil-
ity pattern for the Insiel case study (see Section 4) as tables/SysML diagrams.
Table 3. Relationship Identification View for tracing from FMAF elements to require-
ments engineering elements
Relationship Type Description
tracesTo Indicates a relationship between an FMAF view or view
element and a requirements engineering view or view element.
Table 4. Traceability Identification View for tracing from FMAF elements to require-
ments engineering elements
Traceable Type Relationship
From To Type
Fault/Error/Failure/Definition View Requirement tracesTo
Fault Requirement tracesTo
Error Requirement tracesTo
Failure Requirement tracesTo
detectedBy dependency Use case tracesTo
(Fault Propagation View) Validation View tracesTo
Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios View Validation View tracesTo
Error detection interruptible region Use case tracesTo
(Fault Activation View) Validation View tracesTo
Recovery View
Use case tracesTo
Validation View tracesTo
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Fig. 53. Traceability View for the Fault/Error/Failure Definition View of the Insiel
Case Study
Fig. 54. Traceability View for the Fault Propagation View [Radio System Failure] of
the Insiel Case Study
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Fig. 55. Traceability View for the Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios View [Radio System
Failure] of the Insiel Case Study
Fig. 56. Traceability View for the Fault Activation View [Radio System Failure] of the
Insiel Case Study
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Fig. 57. Traceability View for the Recovery View [Radio System Failure] of the Insiel
Case Study
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